THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF’S DAILY PROGRAMME
Mannerheim’s daily programme evolved with the status of war and his travels. It was based around the lunch and the dinner and recurring situation briefings.
Wake-up and breakfast
In the evening, Mannerheim always advised his orderly at what time he should be woken up the next morning. The breakfast was at around eight. Sometimes the commander-in-chief went for a ride before that. The breakfast was attended by the aides-de-camp. The breakfast, prepared by the commander-in-chief’s housemaid, was often barley porridge or buckwheat porridge.
Walk to the HQ
In Mikkeli, Mannerheim liked walking to places. In the morning, he took the most direct route to the HQ along Ristimäenkatu street. The commander-in-chief was accompanied by his aides-de-camp and a couple of bodyguards. They followed the commander-in-chief as unnoticed as they could.
The working day begins
Mannerheim typically started his working day at nine o’clock. First, he read his post that his Aide-de-Camp Bäckman opened in his presence. That was followed by a presentation session. The combined arms combat teams sent the HQ situation reports twice a day, at 9 o’clock in the morning and by 21 o’clock in the evening. The Operations Division was responsible for collecting the situation reports. In the morning, the commander-in-chief received information about changes in the situation on the front, enemy movements, casualties and reconnaissance situation. When received by the HQ, the situation reports had been prepared about four hours earlier. Considering the communications equipment at the time, this was as close to real-time reporting as one could get.
Lunch at 12:30
The lunch break was held at Mikkelin Klubi at 12:30. Mannerheim went there escorted by his first aide-de-camp, walking along Savilahdenkatu street to the corner of Kirkkopuisto park and then turning to Maaherrankatu street. Mannerheim’s lunch party usually included eight to ten people: the closest subordinates and the key officers and both aides-de-camp.
The basic composition of Mannerheim’s entourage was Chief of the General Staff Erik Heinrichs; Chief of the Command Staff Viljo Tuompo; Quartermaster-General Aksel Airo; General of the Artillery Vilho Nenonen; Chief of Intelligence Aladár Paasonen; First Aide-de-Camp Ragnar Grönvall; and Second Aide-de-Camp Osvald Bäckman. On 6 July, the lunch was attended by Mannerheim’s personal physician Lauri Kalaja; Major General Heikki Kekoni, Head of State Communications Bureau; and Major General Harald Roos, Director-General of the State Railways, the former Chief of Supply & Transport at General Headquarters.
Physical exercise and rest
After lunch, Mannerheim made about an hour’s ride or walk with his aide-de-camp. His horse Käthy was a big, calm and reliable animal. The aide-de-camp planned the route of the ride, but the commander-in-chief decided the pace. Often the rides took the men to the grounds around the Rouhialanjoki river or to Kalevankangas.
As the Continuation War went on and the commander-in-chief’s state of health deteriorated, the hours between two and four in the afternoon were dedicated for uninterrupted work or rest.
Working
The way Mannerheim worked differed from how the general staff usually works, in other words, the chief of the general staff presenting all matters to the commander-in-chief. Mannerheim wanted the presentations directly from Quartermaster-General Airo, Chief of Intelligence Paasonen and other persons requested by him. In addition to the persons mentioned above, the only persons who could enter the commander-in-chief’s office without an appointment were Chief of the General Staff Heinrichs and Chief of the Command Staff Tuompo. Other meetings were agreed with the aides-de-camp. The commander-in-chief could also visit the offices of at least Heinrichs and Airo. The work included keeping in close contact with the president and the Government.
Dinner at 19:30
For the dinner, Mannerheim could also invite some guests, such as officers from the front visiting the Headquarters. There were certain rules that were observed at the dinner table. One should never be late, the commander-in-chief led the conversation, and usually work matters were not discussed. Aides-de-camp checked the menu, the guests and the setting of the table in advance.
Evening presentation at 21:00
After dinner, Mannerheim returned to the HQ and received the evening reports of the Operations Division and intelligence from Airo and Paasonen. He was also given the latest casualty figures. After evening presentation, he often made some phone calls to Helsinki, for example. He usually stopped working at 22:00.
Going to bed
Before going to bed, Mannerheim habitually stopped for a breather, having a drink and reading newspapers. He followed international events closely and read several foreign newspapers on a regular basis. Sometimes, he got inspired to socialise with his aides-de-camp, telling stories about his youth or his years in Russia. He went to bed at around 23:00.
ENABLERS OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF’S WORK
Commander-in-Chief, Marshal of Finland Mannerheim was practically never alone, except when he was sleeping. Commanding a war was a full-time job, where the commander-in-chief had to remain informed at all times. Mannerheim was helped by several people, who assisted him both in his work and at home.
Aides-de-camp providing assistance
Aide-de-camp is an officer who assists a senior officer. During the war, Mannerheim had two aides-de-camp, Major Ragnar Grönvall, who served him from 1939 to 1946, and Second Aide-de-Camp, Captain Rafael Bäckman, who was in service from 1942 to 1946.
“The Marshal had the unusual habit that the aide-de-camp had to be accommodated with him, live with him, work with him and take care of any tasks he in his position quite rightfully considered to belong to someone else,” Grönvall said in 1977. Working as Mannerheim’s aide-de-camp meant being at service 24 hours a day.
The aides-de-camp arranged Mannerheim’s programme for the day according to his wishes, took care of his extensive correspondence and arranged necessary meetings and other affairs. In most cases, Grönvall attended the most important meetings the commander-in-chief had with the political leadership. Bäckman picked up the post, attended the daily ride and followed the “principal” whenever a messenger announced he was going somewhere.
Security of the commander-in-chief
Under war conditions, it was important to ensure the security of the commander-in-chief. Potential threats included air raids, enemy action when visiting the front and, on the home front, parachuted Soviet agents and other situations posing a potential threat.
The Headquarters Surveillance Division was tasked with ensuring Mannerheim’s security. During the Continuation War, the task was handled by a special team commanded by Sergeant First Class Erik Blåfield. The team consisted of 10 to 20 men. The security measures continued 24 hours a day, comprising the commander-in-chief’s accommodation and working premises. Mannerheim was followed whenever he was on the move, whether taking a walk on the streets of Mikkeli or travelling by train or car in different parts of Finland.
During the war years, Mannerheim was at risk almost two dozen times. On five of those occasions, he was a target of bombings or gunfire in the warzone. There were also five different accidents and hazardous situations. In 1943, a pair of Soviet agents were parachuted near Mikkeli tasked with killing the commander-in-chief. After the incident, Mannerheim started taking the security measures more seriously.
Home forces
Mannerheim’s home was in Kaivopuisto, Helsinki, but during the war he seldom had time to visit there. Often, when visiting Helsinki, he spent the night in the train. The people taking care of his home were the housekeepers Berta Haglind and Elsa Sundman, who also worked in Mikkeli sometimes. When Mannerheim moved to Mikkeli, the person who initially took care of his home and many of the daily chores was the cook, Aili Pohjalainen.
Mannerheim’s wartime family also included an orderly and a personal messenger.
He was tasked with taking care of the Marshal’s clothing and belongings at home and at the HQ. In daytime, the messenger was on call in the hallway outside the commander-in-chief’s office. He kept records of the persons who visited the commander-in-chief and ran errands, if necessary.
Mannerheim had several cars at his disposal and a regular driver, Kauko Ranta. He was tasked with transporting the commander-in-chief safely to any desired place at a designated time.
MILITARY CAREER AS A STRATEGY
An orphaned young nobleman without means
Gustaf Mannerheim was born on 4 June 1867. He was the third child of the whimsical Count Carl Robert Mannerheim and Hélène von Julin, who came from a wealthy industrial family. As a boy and young man, Gustaf was self-willed, unruly and wild. He got expelled first from the Helsinki Private Lyceum in 1879 and then from the Hamina Cadet School in 1885. After that, Gustaf pulled himself together. He passed the secondary-school graduation exam with good grades and decided to apply to the Nicholas Cavalry College in Saint Petersburg. He aimed to serve in the Chevalier Guard Regiment, the Regiment of Her Imperial Majesty the Empress of Russia.
Elite networks
Service in the Chevalier Guard Regiment took Mannerheim to the core of the Russian empire. He became part of the imperial elite. He internalised the international customs of the high nobility and the way a great power thinks. Mannerheim served in the Court Stables Department in 1897‒1903. He travelled around Central Europe buying horses for the court and socialised with officers and people from European courts. In most cases, the language used was French, but Mannerheim also learnt English and German. His officer career, however, advanced slowly. In 1903, he returned to the Imperial Chevalier Guard and was put in charge of its model squadron.
Learning the art of war in the Imperial Russian Army
When the Russo-Japanese War broke out in 1904, Mannerheim was 37. His marriage had failed, and he was frustrated by his stagnating military career. He came to the conclusion: If I’m not involved in this, I risk becoming nothing more than a cabinet soldier. He volunteered for the Russo-Japanese War. He rode across Asia as part of a reconnaissance expedition in 1906–1908 and served as a regiment commander in Poland in 1909–1913. Finally, he acted as field commander in World War I fronts in Galicia, southern Poland and Romania.
During his years in Poland and in World War I, Mannerheim developed into a field commander who knew how to use his service branch, the cavalry, in breakthrough and pursuit situations, and on the flanks when engaged in strategic outflanking manoeuvres. He also learned to spare his men and to combine the operations of the cavalry, artillery and infantry. As the war progressed, the societal climate of Russia changed, the combat morale in the army deteriorated and the loyalty to authorities declined. Mannerheim left his military career in Russia because of the revolution and returned to Finland in December 1917.
THE ART OF WAR
The policy is always the object; war is only the means by which we obtain the object. In one word, the art of war in its highest point of view is policy, but, no doubt, a policy which fights battles, instead of writing notes.
– von Clausewitz
The art of war means the art of leading military forces to attain the object of war. It has a political-strategic dimension and encompasses both operational art and tactical skills. It means leadership skills that evolve within the human, social and societal framework.
1918 – CIVIL WAR – WAR OF INDEPENDENCE – CITIZEN WAR – RED REBELLION
At a top level in the art of war – An experienced field commander
When Lieutenant General Mannerheim arrived in Finland, he was 50 years old. He had a long and successful military career behind him in the Imperial Russian Army. He was an experienced field commander who had commanded a cavalry army corps of more than 11,000 men in the First World War. During the First World War, the Imperial Russian Army did not have more than about a dozen positions of similar status. On the other hand, Mannerheim had never served in large headquarters and lacked staff officer training. After returning to Finland, he was appointed chairman of the Military Committee on 15 January 1918.
First move and initiative
Chairman of the Senate P. E. Svinhufvud had tasked Mannerheim, who led the military committee, with restoring law and order in the country. It was decided that the headquarters of the White Army would be set up in Vaasa, and Mannerheim travelled there. The men he selected to his headquarters were mainly people he knew from the past who had attended the Hamina Cadet School in the 1880s.
Mannerheim’s first operational order was to disarm the Russian garrison in Ostrobothnia. It was a daring operation. The headquarters disagreed on how it should be executed due to the great superiority of the Russian forces. The operation succeeded. It provided the army with free operating conditions in Ostrobothnia and gave time for further planning. By his actions, Mannerheim proved that there was no doubt about who deserved to be in command of the headquarters.
An operative and strategic choice
After having won some time to manoeuvre, the White Army organisation was created under Mannerheim’s command. The HQ staff was supplemented with volunteering Swedish general staff officers. The army was made up of the Civil Guards, jaegers and those called up based on the conscription law. Training was arranged for them, and they were provided with equipment and weapons. After this, it was possible to draw up operational plans. The army was divided into Satakunta, Tavastia, Savonia and Vyborg groups.
Tampere was an important logistical centre for the Reds but, strategically, Vyborg was the most important target. The Government had sent a formal request for military assistance to Germany, and German troops attacked the Reds from the rear. Mannerheim decided to focus the attack to Tampere as this would secure the opportunities to transfer allied troops to other fronts and to supply them. In addition, the operation could be executed using their own forces, without any German assistance. The war ended with the victory of the army commanded by Mannerheim.
At the end of the Civil War, Mannerheim was first and foremost a white general for whom defeating the Bolsheviks in Russia remained an important goal.
FROM A CIVILIAN TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DEFENCE COUNCIL
After the Civil War, Mannerheim resigned as commander-in-chief because he disagreed about cooperating with Germany. In December 1918, when the leaning towards Germany was over, Mannerheim was invited to act as Regent. Mannerheim was not elected in the presidential election held in summer 1919. This was followed by a decade of civilian life, during which Mannerheim travelled and maintained his European networks.
In 1931, President Svinhufvud invited Mannerheim to act as chairman of Finland’s Defence Council. The position was tailored for him. At first, it also included a secret order that in the event of war he would become the Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Army. This was the start of the most significant phase of Mannerheim’s military career.
The developing Finnish Defence Forces
In the 1920s, the development of the Finnish Defence Forces was characterised by improvements in training, and in the 1930s in the mobilisation system, weaponry and war materiel. In the late 1930s, training and tactical skills were at a good level, but lack of materiel caused problems. As chairman of the Defence Council, Mannerheim focused closely on increasing military appropriations. They were increased little by little, but it was not until 1938 that the increase in appropriations included in the Basic Procurement Act alleviated the situation. It happened too late.
Updating the art of war
When acting as chairman of the Defence Council, Mannerheim started to actively update his knowledge of the art of war by studying the military situation in Finland and Europe. Weapons technology was developing rapidly. Tanks and anti-tank weapons, artillery, air power, the use of gas and the advances made in other weaponry were substantially transforming the way battles were fought. In 1934, Mannerheim visited the United Kingdom, France and Germany to get acquainted with the development of air force. In 1937, he visited the United Kingdom to learn about the use of tanks. In Finland, he observed military exercises, and promoted the continuance of the fortification work and finding a location for the main headquarters.
When the Second World War erupted, Mannerheim considered it important to safeguard the Finnish society as a whole. He recommended making concessions to the Soviet Union in autumn 1939, because he had doubts about Finland’s material defence capability in relation to the Soviet Union with its superior resources.
WINTER WAR 1939‒1940
The leadership of the commander-in-chief is indivisible
Mannerheim took over as commander-in-chief on 30 November 1939 when the Soviet Union bombed Finland. The situation had been preceded by a resignation episode. Mannerheim had announced to the president that he would resign from the position of the chairman of the Defence Council to protest against insufficient defence resources.
Seizing the initiative was the cornerstone of the art of war practised by Mannerheim. In the early days of the Winter War, he seized the command of the war in his own hands. The operations division of the headquarters understood that the commander-in-chief’s words are not to be challenged, the field commander is to be changed if the orders are not followed and the Ministry of Defence is no longer to appoint officers to an army at war. For the rank and file and ordinary citizens, confidence in the commander-in-chief and his experience would guarantee success. Mannerheim considered it necessary that the army gain a partial victory that would lift the morale and spirits of the fighting army and the citizens.
Experience
When the Winter War began, Mannerheim was still the only senior officer in Finland with experience of large-scale warfare. He had to keep on trying to solve how a numerically inferior defender could survive.
The rapid withdrawal of the protection force from the Karelian Isthmus and the powerful Soviet attack on the northern side of Lake Ladoga came as a surprise. The victory won at Tolvajärvi on 12 December was of great importance. The attention was turned to Lake Ladoga and the North Karelian front up until February. However, the decisive battles were fought on the Karelian Isthmus.
Mannerheim had already established the way he preferred to work back in 1918: he heard several people and stated his decision after personal deliberation. Mannerheim did not follow the general staff operating procedure.
The art of ending the war
Successful defensive battles and getting the front established lifted people’s spirits in the early phases of the war. The international attitudes were in favour of Finland, but was there any chance of receiving any real assistance quickly enough? It was the fact that the aggressor was many times stronger than the defender, both in terms of troops and weaponry.
Mannerheim, commanding the war, had to be capable of seeing when it was time to make a move from a state of war to peace. Viewed through Mannerheim’s eyes, Finland’s situation was critical, and the Finnish Army had reached the limit of its capabilities. When the peace agreement was signed on 13 March 1940, the Finnish army still had operational capability and the country had avoided occupation.
THE INTERIM PEACE 1940‒1941 – PREPARING FOR NEW WAR
Policy of war
After the Winter War ended on 13 March 1940, Mannerheim continued as commander-in-chief. The great war continued in Europe and soon accelerated as Germany conquered Denmark, Norway, France, Belgium and the Netherlands in quick succession. Finland was left isolated from the Allies and all trade connections were cut off. The Soviet Union occupied the Baltic countries and put pressure on Finland in many ways during the summer of 1940.
Protection and materiel
Fortification came high on Mannerheim’s list of priorities. Immediately after the peace agreement had been signed, he ordered the building of a line of fortifications – the Salpa Line – to begin within the new national border. At the same time, the strengthening of the defence capability was initiated regarding materiel, weaponry and ammunition supply. The experiences from the Winter War had shown that the only way Finland could manage was by being well prepared.
Preparing for a new war
Mannerheim considered the threat of war real. During the interwar period, he was ready to initiate partial mobilisation on two occasions. Finland’s position started to appear in a new light when in October-November 1940 the military command was informed that Hitler would not let the Soviet Union occupy Finland. Mannerheim felt that a new war would offer an opportunity to remedy the earlier injustice. The support provided by Germany would also give a chance to destroy the Soviet Union ruled by Bolshevists. As of January 1941, the Finnish military command – with Mannerheim’s blessing – conducted negotiations with the German military command.
Mannerheim believed Finland would not be able to successfully avoid the war when Germany would attack the Soviet Union.
MANNERHEIM AS A PERSON
Mannerheim was raised as his time and his social class required. He lived many decades among the elite of the Russian empire, which educated him into an aristocrat and citizen of the world. He spoke several languages and understood the meaning of authority and cooperation networks as an instrument of influence.
Mannerheim was an excellent rider. Over his military career, he had also learned to adjust himself to demanding conditions. When accepting the position of commander-in-chief in 1939, Mannerheim was 72 years old and when resigning from the office of president he was 78. During the war years, in winter in particular, Mannerheim suffered from such illnesses as colds, pneumonia, gastric ulcer and painful rash, as well as gout and rheumatism.
As a leader, Mannerheim was demanding. He expected his subordinates to know what to do even without guidance. He also expected them to be always at his disposal. Mannerheim’s firm grip and strong personality caused friction among the generals, but he was not lightly challenged. The path to meeting the commander-in-chief always went through the official channels – there were no shortcuts. To those closest to him, he was a difficult person, but he also understood the power of saying thank you.
Mannerheim was reserved and kept his opinions to himself. His sister Sophie was dear to him. His daughters Anastasie and Sophie lived in England and France during the war.
THE WAR MARSHAL ASSAULTS – ONE FRONT AT A TIME
Strategic decisions
On 22 June, Germany invaded the Soviet Union. In response to Soviet air raids on Finnish cities and airfields, the Finnish state leadership declared war on 25 June. The military cooperation between Germany and Finland had become closer during summer 1941 with Mannerheim’s consent. No formal political agreement on an alliance was signed. Finland was responsible for the front up to the level of Oulu-Belomorsk and Germany for the northern part of the front.
Mannerheim maintained his role as an independent decision-maker and neither he nor the Finnish Army became a part of the German Army. However, in the offensive phase, he consented to the German proposal to launch an attack via the north of Lake Ladoga towards the Svir River. This focus of the attack supported the German objective of occupying Leningrad.
For Mannerheim, it was clear that a political decision was required from President Ryti and the Government to cross the old border and to stop the attack on the Karelian Isthmus on the way towards Leningrad.
Operational actions
The Army of Karelia was formed on 29 June to mount the attack to capture Petrozavodsk and to reach the Svir River. Mannerheim appointed his trusted general, Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Erik Heinrichs as commander of the combined arms force. The Army of Karelia with almost 100,000 men was Finland’s biggest combined arms force. It started its attack on 10 July.
The II Corps, acting more to the south, was tasked with cutting off the overland connections between Lake Ladoga and the Karelian Isthmus. The attack was launched on 31 July. After a successful mission, the IV Corps launched an attack on the Western Isthmus at the end of August with an aim to capture Vyborg.
The offensives were planned at the Finnish Headquarters and approved by Mannerheim. All targets set by Finland were achieved by the end of 1941. Germany failed to occupy Leningrad but besieged the city.
Observations related to the art of war
In the early days of the war, Mannerheim inspected front-line troops as he had done in the Winter War. This time, the army was bigger and better equipped, but did not have much experience of offensive warfare.
In the beginning, Mannerheim steered the operations of the Army of Karelia closely since the Headquarters had a better picture of the enemy produced by intelligence and the army lacked experience of large-scale operations. In the attack to recapture Vyborg in August, Mannerheim gave the commanders freer hands.
Mannerheim emphasised the need to minimise losses in men and the meaning of the use of fire as successful preparation fire protected the aggressor. He was also a realist. He was not surprised by the dogged resistance of the Russians and the impact of the winter on the advance of German forces.
TRENCH WARFARE IN THE SHADOW OF THE GREAT WAR
Best interests of society and changes in the army
When Finland’s offensive stopped by the end of 1941, Mannerheim allowed reducing the strength of the army by 100,000 men. This brought workforce to the home front and secured the functioning of society. The reduction made the front line vulnerable and shrank the commander-in-chief’s reserves to almost nothing.
The army was reorganised to Kannas, Aunus and Maaselkä Groups subordinated to the Headquarters. The Red Army attacked on the Isthmus of Maaselkä and to a lesser extent elsewhere, but the Finnish troops succeeded in the defensive battles. The most significant offensive made by the Finnish troops was the capture of Gogland in March 1942. It stopped the ship traffic on the Gulf of Finland. In summer, a naval operation was executed on Lake Ladoga mainly by German and Italian forces to tighten the siege of Leningrad.
Doubts about Germany’s success
Already in the summer of 1941, Mannerheim started having doubts about the advance of Germany’s offensive, and they became stronger the next year. The decisions the commander-in-chief made showed that he believed that Germany would lose the war. The decisive developments included the invasion of North Africa by the Allies at the end of 1942, the land corridor to Leningrad opened by the Red Army in January 1943, and the German defeat at Stalingrad.
Mannerheim deployed Paavo Talvela as representative of the commander-in-chief in the German High Command and sent him to visit the Caucasian front. At the same time, he refused to participate in cutting off the Murmansk Railway, which had become a Soviet supply route, at Belomorsk and to advance towards Leningrad in the direction of the Svir River. The Germans were unable to execute their share of the operation, which served as grounds for the refusal. Instead, Finland did receive grain, raw materials and energy resources from Germany.
War-weariness
Trench warfare continued for two and a half years. Both the civilian society and troops all the way from the front-line forces to commanders were weary of war. The HQ became prisoners of their earlier success. Not enough attention was paid to how the enemy’s art of war was developing. The frequent illnesses of Commander-in-Chief Mannerheim made the operations of the highest HQ command difficult.
EXPECTED MAJOR OFFENSIVE
A major offensive is a question of time
Early in 1943, Mannerheim believed that Germany would lose the war and informed the Finnish Government and Parliament about this. When in January 1944 Germany retreated from the siege of Leningrad, the Finnish flank was left unprotected. The HQ knew a major offensive was to come on the Karelian Isthmus. From autumn 1943 onward, orders were given to strengthen the defence readiness.
Mannerheim transferred the Armoured Brigade to the Isthmus. The strengthening of the Viipuri-Kuparsaari-Taipale line of defence (VKT line) was initiated in February 1944. Fortification troops were transferred from Eastern Karelia to the Isthmus. The change happened slowly, and the HQ failed to monitor the execution of the orders related to strengthening the defensive arrangements in combined arms to a sufficient extent. The Isthmus was not totally unfortified as there were 1,300 fortification structures along the Vammelsuu–Taipale line (VT line).
Actions to halt the offensive
The Soviet Union launched its major offensive on 9 June 1944. The rapid failure of the bridgehead surprised Mannerheim. He transferred all available reserves to the Karelian Isthmus and set up the Isthmus Group HQ to lead the battle. Finland requested air support, antitank and assault guns, and more Panzerfaust and Panzerschreck antitank weapons from Germany. The decisive battles of the war were fought on the Isthmus, just like in the Winter War. The objective was to stabilise the situation and to get the forces grouped for controlled defensive battle.
Chances of successful defensive battle
The Soviet Union advanced 100 km in less than two weeks and captured Vyborg on 20 June. At first, the Finnish troops retreated under heavy fire in a chaotic manner. One means used to enhance the combat readiness was stronger discipline. The line of defence became stronger, and over the following weeks the attack was halted at Tali-Ihantala in the largest battle in Nordic military history. On 12 July, Stalin ordered the major offensive to be stopped and turned his attention to Berlin.
WILL TO END THE WAR
Peace negotiations and realism
In February 1943, the Government decided that Finland must detach itself from the war. There were no prerequisites for that due to the Soviet territorial demands and the threat of Germany’s punitive measures. In summer 1944, Mannerheim also actively promoted peace negotiations. However, due to not only the Soviet Union’s territorial demands and huge war reparations, but also the potential German countermeasures, the risk was considered too high. It was not certain whether the Finnish Army would have followed its commander-in-chief to peace under uncertain circumstances.
The art of achieving peace
All actions Mannerheim took to halt the major offensive aimed at detaching Finland from the war. As condition for military assistance for Finland, Germany required a treaty. A personal promise to Hitler by President Ryti was enough to meet the condition. Ryti stepped down as president, and Parliament elected Mannerheim as the President of the Republic on 4 August 1944. A new government was formed. Two weeks later, Mannerheim told the Germans that an assurance given by Ryti was not binding on him.
Germany’s weak situation on the eastern front did not give the country any opportunity to prevent Finland from detaching itself from the war. The Soviet Union required that Finland break off all relations with Germans and expel them from Finnish territory within two weeks. As president and commander-in-chief, Mannerheim approved this. An armistice was signed on 4–5 September 1944. Mannerheim’s authority played a key role in reaching the agreement, although the decision was not unanimous.
The price of peace – Lapland War
The situation came to a head in Lapland when more than 200,000 German soldiers were ordered to leave the Finnish territory within a tight schedule. A surprise attack on Gogland made by Germans led to hostilities between former brothers-in-arms in Lapland.
Mannerheim had given orders to draw up plans for protecting Lapland as early as in autumn 1943. The population was evacuated and brought to safety in Sweden and on the southern side of the Oulujoki river. The retreat begun in mutual understanding but turned into a war. It led to extensive destruction of the building stock and infrastructure in Lapland. The lands were also mined which continued to cause damage long after the war had ended.
Mannerheim succeeded in detaching Finland from the great war. The country had not been occupied and the army remained functional, just like after the Winter War. Mannerheim left his position as commander-in-chief at the end of 1944 and stepped down as president on 4 March 1946.
